The Alliance for Progress in Uruguay: Political Dynamics, Legacy and Lessons Learned[1]

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During the first half of the 1960s, under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress, Uruguay carried out the most ambitious planning effort of its history. The government set up an office to design the plans: the Technical Secretariat of the Commission on Investment and Economic Development (CIDE, in Spanish). In late 1965, the CIDE made available to the government its most important product, the National Economic and Social Development Plan (1965-1974). In early 1966, the government formally approved the plan, but never implemented it. However, both economic and social information and reform proposals generated by CIDE deeply permeated the political debate and the positions of the main social and political actors. This experience confirms the main conclusions of the research and policy "nexus" literature but, at the same time, invites us to devise and put forward new hypotheses.

Keywords: CIDE, Uruguay, Alliance for Progress, research, public policies

INTRODUCTION

The decade of the 1960s is usually seen as the slow prologue to the breakdown of Uruguayan democracy, one of the most stable in the region, which occurred in 1973. The most frequent approaches in historiography pay special attention to the eruption of political violence (forging and rise of the National Liberation Movement - Tupamaros), to the intensification of the mobilization of workers' and students' organizations, to the efforts to impose order by the successive governments of the National Party and the Colorado Party, all of these in the context of unrest produced by economic stagnation and accelerating inflation. The decade of the sixties, of course, was *all* that. But it was not *only* that. In addition, between 1961 and 1965, the greatest economic planning effort in the country's history was carried out. This task, executed by the Technical Secretariat of the Commission of Investment and Economic Development (CIDE), was carried out within the framework of the Alliance for Progress and marked the highest point of the curve of the influence of Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean's (ECLAC) developmentalist ideas in Uruguay.

The first objective of this paper is, precisely, to offer a synthetic review of this history and the legacy of planning, which is supported by exhaustive fieldwork. But, along with this objective, the article has a theoretical purpose. Planning, as it was conceived at the time (classical, traditional or normative planning), represents a particularly ambitious effort to incorporate research results into public policy. This approach to planning assumes that public policies can and should be rationalized through the direct application of proposals for change derived from scientific knowledge. Political and social actors, their ideologies and interests, must be subjected to the iron discipline of reason, of science. Seen from this angle, the CIDE

experience offers an excellent opportunity to apply the conceptual tools that have been developed in recent years by scholars of the nexus between social research and public policy.

The National Party in Government: The Alliance for Progress (ALPRO) as an Opportunity

As in the rest of Latin America, the crisis of 1929 also triggered an important industrialization process in Uruguay. It was up to the Colorado Party (CP) to lead this effort, which intensified during the second half of the 1950s, the period of greatest influence of Luis Batlle Berres. Meanwhile, from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Raúl Prebisch began to disseminate the central ideas of his vision of the development process in Latin America. The Uruguayan developmentalism, therefore, reached its climax before the structuralist paradigm began to be disseminated in Uruguay by Luis Faroppa in the classrooms of the Faculty of Economics and Administration (FEA) and among his colleagues at the Institute of Economics. In fact, Eclacist ideas landed in Uruguay when the "empirical" developmentalism promoted by the CP had already entered into crisis.

In the 1958 elections, the National Party succeeded in gaining access to government. The Alliance for Progress, with its emphasis on the production of technical knowledge, its broad agenda of structural reforms and its financial support for social policies, opened up a formidable political opportunity. It was clear to the leaders of the National Party that in order to keep the government they had to perform impeccably at office. The coincidence in timing of the pan-Americanist turn in Washington and the rotation of parties in power in Uruguay was an unusual stroke of luck. After ninety-three years of waiting, the National Party acceded to power at a more than favorable moment: by rapidly elaborating a *"broad and well-conceived"* development plan (as required by the "Punta del Este Charter"), they could obtain resources to carry out relevant innovations. The consolidation of the National Party in government or the return to the extensive "pax batllista" would depend on the talent and audacity with which the party leaders handled the opportunity created by the new climate of inter-American relations.

But Uruguay, unlike other countries in the region such as Argentina, Brazil or Colombia, had no experience in planning: the attempts made by Nilo Berchesi (during his brief tenure as Minister of Finance in the late 1940s) to set up a planning office in Uruguay had been trapped in the tangle of particularism that marked the political dynamics of the mid-century. Thus, the government of the National Party turned to the only institution that could offer human resources suitable for the challenge: the University of the Republic. In fact, the university had no specialists in planning. However, since the beginning of the 1950s, the number of students and graduates of the Faculty of Economics and Administration had been increasing. This faculty also had some small but very active research teams in development and economic policy. Researchers, graduates and students of Economics will be fundamental in the preparation of the plans.

To lead the preparation of the plans, the government immediately summoned accountant Enrique Iglesias[2], who had been a young prominent figure at the Institute of Economics of the FEA since the early 1950s. By decision of Juan Eduardo Azzini, Minister of Finance, the planning team would be installed in an office specially created for this purpose: the Technical Secretariat of the CIDE. In addition to recruiting Iglesias, the government requested technical support from the OAS, the IDB and ECLAC. All the planning work was based on these two pillars: on the one hand, Enrique Iglesias, leading the network of Uruguayan experts; on the other hand, Ángel Monti, heading the Planning Advisory Group (PAG) made up of a carefully selected group of foreign planning experts. According to Monti himself, about 95 experts were hired between 1961 and 1966. The PAG members bore the main responsibility for technical guidance and plans. They were experienced officials with a high technical level and a strong vocation for the "*mission*" of Latin American development. From the ideological point of view, most of them were close to Christian Democrats and Socialists.

The members of the PAG led the various working groups[3] that prepared the information, plans and sectoral projects. They were the *senior* researchers of each group, where they taught the planning technique to their assistants, a large group of Uruguayan experts recruited mainly among advanced students and young graduates of the Faculty of Economics and Administration (FEA). Another important aspect of CIDE's human resources was the contingent of civil servants who were commissioned to CIDE. In 1963, for example, there were twenty-six local experts under contract and nineteen *"on commission"*.[4]

In addition to the groups of experts specially formed for the task of planning, the Technical Secretariat weaved a network of "*CIDE support* groups" within numerous government offices. The most notorious were the Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay's (BROU) Economic Research Department and the National Statistics Directorate. In total, according to the estimates of those responsible, about three hundred Uruguayan experts collaborated in one way or another in the work of preparing the diagnoses, plans and projects. This long list includes, for example, the names of Juan José Anichini, Valentín Arismendi, Danilo Astori, Celia Barbato, Alberto Bensión, Oscar Bruschera, Mario Bucheli, Francisco Buxedas, Agustín Canessa, Miguel Cecilio, Alberto Couriel, Ariel Davrieux, Carlos de Mattos, Luis Faroppa, Martha Jauge, José Gil Díaz, Romeo Grompone, Samuel Lichtensztejn, Walter Lusiardo Aznárez, Luis Macadar, Alicia Melgar, José María Puppo, Germán Rama, Pedro Seré, Aldo Solari, Ana María Teja, Juan Pablo Terra, Raúl Trajtenberg, Alejandro Végh Villegas, José Claudio Williman, Israel Wonsewer and Ricardo Zerbino.

When the ministers became enthusiastic about the task of planning, they convened particularly powerful working groups. Juan Pivel Devoto, Minister of Public Instruction of the second white collegiate, did not hide his enthusiasm for the CIDE. Under his aegis, the following people worked: Rolando Sánchez (former Vice Minister of Education of Chile) as PAG expert; Aldo Solari and Alberto Couriel as advisors; Germán Rama and Ricardo Zerbino as coordinators; Agustín Canessa, Raúl Cariboni, Miguel Cecilio, Carlos de Mattos, Alicia Melgar and Jorge Saxlund as permanent collaborators; Sofía Aguiar, Aída Müller, Marta Cecilli, Juan José Pereira and Juan J. Aguerre as collaborators. The same happened with the Minister of Livestock, Wilson Ferreira Aldunate. The working team of the agricultural CIDE was made up of: Jesús González (for the Chilean PAG), Antonio Pérez García, Danilo Astori, Celia Barbato, José María Gimeno, Alfredo Terra, López Taborda, Miguel Cetrángolo, Lilián Sierra and Francisco Buxedas.

Between 1961 and 1963 CIDE generated the basic information required by the usual planning technique of the time and prepared the first comprehensive diagnosis of the economic crisis: the *Economic Study of Uruguay (*published in May 1963). Although the data collection work was carried out by each and every sector, the most significant contributions were made by the Demography and National Accounts sectors. The Demography sector, led by Alfredo Cataldi, made an estimate of the population of Uruguay that anticipated almost perfectly the global results of the Population and Housing Census carried out in 1963. The census was a milestone: the last one had been carried out in 1908. The National Accounts sector, composed of BROU officials (the so-called *"twelve apostles"*) under the direction of the Argentine expert Alberto Fracchia, generated for the first time in the country complete data on GDP and national accounts. In the *Economic Survey of Uruguay*, on the basis of the information previously generated, CIDE experts formulated a complete diagnosis of the country's situation. Their conclusions had a strong public impact: *"The Uruguayan economy entered, after the second post-war period, a stage of stagnation in its productive system which, if it persisted, could threaten all the progress that the country had achieved in the first decades of the century"*.[5]

The Plans

Between 1963 and 1965, each group completed the elaboration of plans and reform proposals. In order to make them compatible, the Technical Secretariat appointed Juan Pablo Terra, Germán Rama and Alberto Couriel. The final drafting of the National Economic and Social Development Plan 1965-1974 was entrusted to Ángel Monti. The result: eleven kilograms of paper distributed in six voluminous volumes. The NESDP was inspired, as already mentioned, by the Eclacist paradigm. But it was not a mere copy. In Monti's words:

> "Our plan was in no way a slavish copy of ECLAC's conceptions. Not at all. At the time, it is true that ECLAC had weight in Latin America (...). But there was no ECLAC ideology structured down to the smallest detail. There was no ECLAC model that was slavishly applied in each country".[6]

In fact, during the planning process, the Eclacine ideas underwent three processes of adaptation. First, they were adapted to the political objectives of the Alliance for Progress (greater emphasis on social

problems). Second, they were intermingled with endogenous knowledge contributed by local experts. Thirdly, given the pluralism that characterized the integration of the groups, the elaboration of the proposals very often required compromises between the different points of view of the various protagonists.

Main National Economic Social Development Plan (NESDP) recommendations by sector.

TABLE 1
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS BY SECTORS OF PLANNING

SECTOR	MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS
Agricultural	Seven laws: agrarian reform, forestry, seeds-soil-water, cooperatives, fertilizers, procedures. Prohibition of joint stock companies.
Industry	Selective promotion: Industrial Promotion Law. Non-monopolistic participation of the State in the sugar, steel and fertilizer industries.
Energy	Modernization of UTE and ANCAP. Realistic tariffs. Explicit subsidies.
Transportation	Creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
Communications	Integration of networks. Creation of the Ministry and Administración Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ANTEL).
Tourism	Promotion of foreign tourism.
Education	Coordination and rationalization of education, strengthening of technical education, extension of preschool, rationalization of university entrance.
Housing	National Housing Plan-Housing Law. Institutional reform: creation of DINAVI and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.
Territorial Planning	Creation of the Directorate of Territorial Planning in the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism.
Water and Sanitation	Extension of services. Strengthening of Obras Sanitarias del Estado (OSE). Realistic tariffs.
Health	National Health Service. National Health Insurance
Public Administration	Strengthening the technical capacity of the State. New ministries. Institutionalization of planning. Civil service. Budget by programs
Tax	Redistribution and increase of the tax burden. Finalist taxes. Strengthening of income tax. Tax on low agricultural productivity.
Social Security	Prevent collapse. Modify retirement age. Eliminate benefits.
Foreign Trade	Export incentives. Selective tariff reductions.
Financial	Central Bank. Development Bank. Private banking at the service of the public interest.
Prices	Gradual and concerted stabilization. Social Agreement.

Source: Prepared by the authors based on PNDES 1965-1974.

How can we define the proposal for change contained in the NESDP? The simplest way to characterize it is to see it as a sort of middle ground between the two approaches that polarized the ideological debate of the time. Neither socialist revolution nor indiscriminate turn to the market: in order to walk the road to development, Uruguay would have to rationalize and modernize its capitalist system. The new model would have a "simple and almost obvious philosophy: future growth around a very aggressive expansion of the country abroad".[7] The expansion of exports required, in turn, through agrarian reform, the removal of the "structural obstacles" that prevented the increase of productivity in the countryside. At the same time, it would be necessary to rationalize industrial policy in order to move from indiscriminate protectionism to selective industrial promotion. The necessary expansion of productivity in the private sector had to be accompanied by a similar process in the public sector. To this end, it was essential to carry out a tax reform (strengthening the income tax that had been created in 1960), a strong investment in infrastructure (energy, transportation, communications), a profound administrative reform (reorganization and professionalization

of ministries and the administrative function) and a reorganization of the financial system (increasing public regulation through the creation of a Central Bank and strongly developing development banking). The "take-off" required modernizing social policies (education, housing, health, social security) and combating inflation (through the strategy of promoting a Social Agreement, that is, a truce in the distributive struggle between social groups).

The NESDP reforms would only make sense, from the point of view of the plan's drafters, if they were undertaken simultaneously. For the development experts, to elaborate a plan was not just to establish a detailed set of goals. In reality, a true development program amounted to a global agenda of harmonious and convergent structural reforms: "the essential thing about them is that they must be concurrent".[8]

The Legacy of Planning

In February 1966 the National Council of Government formally approved the plans. However, neither that government (of the National Party) nor the following one (of the Colorado Party) implemented the plans *in totum*, that is, as the complex clockwork mechanism that the experts had wanted to manufacture. Thus was born the widespread legend of the "*failure*" of the CIDE. In any case, the planning effort left a broad legacy on several levels: production of information and specialized knowledge, changes in the political agenda and in the perception of the country's problems by social groups, renewal of party ideologies, reforms in public policies and modernization of State structures.

New Data, New Issues, New Approaches

The construction of new social data (especially the Population and Housing Census and the National Accounts) generated a very important increase in the volume and quality of available knowledge. Insisting on this idea, Celia Barbato has said that, thanks to CIDE, Uruguay "discovered itself".[9] On the basis of this information, and thanks to the active participation of foreign experts, some social disciplines were rapidly strengthened. The most notorious case is that of Economics. First, the planning process trained dozens of economists, many of whom would end up with important government responsibilities in the following years. Second, the CIDE experience facilitated the creation of closer links between the growing community of national economists and the outside world. For example, Astori, Couriel and Zerbino went to perfect their knowledge of planning techniques at the Latin American and Caribbean Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) in Chile in the late 1960s. Finally, during these years and thanks to the prestige of the work carried out by CIDE, the interest of the Uruguayan society in the study of economic problems grew strongly.

The dissemination of the economic information generated had a very strong impact on Uruguayan society. The notion of "structural crisis" had already been part of the political debate since the mid 1950s. However, it was only after the publication of the Economic Survey of Uruguay that it acquired real political weight: the conformist imaginary, which had predominated during the previous three decades, was severely challenged. After the CIDE, the notions of "structural crisis" and "stagnation", cause and consequence, would become part of the discourse of the main actors for decades, regardless of their ideology. The recommended structural reforms also had a high impact on the agenda. Many of the programmatic axes of the NESDP (from agrarian reform to administrative modernization, including "outward growth") were integrated into the discursive landscape of the following three decades.

Changes in Party Ideologies

Between 1961 and 1963, between the Punta del Este Conference and the publication of the Economic Study of Uruguay, developmentalist ideas managed to gain a wide audience in vast sectors of society, from the Chamber of Commerce to the workers' unions. The political parties, naturally, were not unaffected by this circumstance. In one way or another, with a few exceptions, they received the doctrinaire influence of the new ideas.

The National Party was not the most suitable institutional home for the nesting of developmentalist ideas. At the beginning of the sixties, most of the white leaders maintained the most typical ideological features of this group: first, the liberal vocation in economic matters, which had led them for decades to be

critical of the Colorado Party's authoritarism; second, the vindication of doxa versus episteme, of the knowledge of the politician (and of the citizen) versus that of the expert. However, the planning work was enthusiastically supported by two very important figures of the second collegiate of the NP (1963-1966): Washington Beltrán, from the National Council of Government and by Wilson Ferreira, from the Ministry of Livestock. The basic doctrine of the NESDP was very well adjusted to the main features of Wilson's thinking for whom, since the times of his sympathy for Carlos Quijano and the Agrupación Nacionalista Demócrata Social, agrarian reform constituted an absolute priority. Wilson Ferreira's enthusiasm for developmentalist ideas becomes abundantly clear when one reviews the government program Our Commitment to You, prepared by his sector for the 1971 elections. In it are present the main basic proposals of the CIDE: agrarian, financial, tax reform, etcetera. While the confrontation with government leaded by President Jorge Pacheco (1967-1971) earned him his image as a brilliant tribune and implacable "prosecutor", his support of CIDE allowed him to position himself as a modern statesman.

It was even more difficult for the Colorado Party than for the whites to nourish itself from the CIDE. Three types of considerations operated on the Colorados. In the first place, a general prejudice against anything that bore the NP's stamp. In the words of Julio María Sanguinetti: "At the beginning, the colorados looked at the CIDE with great distrust: nothing good could come from the enemies of the batllism".[10] Secondly, political survival strategies were inevitably at work. For the Colorados, displaced from the government in 1958 after ninety-three years of predominance, regaining power was the absolute priority. Thirdly, distrust of the technocracy also weighed heavily. Distrust towards technocrats was more intense in the non-Batllista wing of the party. The Batllista tradition, historically, is one of the most open to experts and their knowledge.[11] For this very reason, the younger leaders within the Batllista wing will be abundantly nourished by developmentalist proposals. The Unity and Reform grouping of List 15, led by Jorge Batlle and Julio María Sanguinetti, for example, made extensive use of the administrative reforms chapter of the NESDP during the period of elaboration of the "orange" constitutional reform. Towards the end of the 1960s, some of the experts linked to List 15 who had participated in the elaboration of the plan (Bensión, Zerbino, Gil Díaz, Anichini) came into contact with the thinking of Roberto Campos, Minister of Planning during the Castello Branco government (1964-1967). This doctrinal evolution (from developmentalism to neoliberalism) will be reflected in the second National Development Plan (1973-1977), which offers a mix of both approaches.[12]

The Colorado sector that most decidedly launched itself into the encounter with developmentalist ideas was List 99. The leader of the sector, Zelmar Michelini, like Wilson Ferreira, quickly tuned in to the rationalist reformism of the CIDE proposal. But Michelini had to find a way to obtain the political benefit of raising the attractive developmentalist ideas without paying the political cost of appearing as the NP'S caboose. The way to solve this puzzle was to appeal to the only figure who publicly and notoriously gathered both attributes: professor Luis Faroppa, a prestigious economist, Colorado and developmentalist, was invited to lead the elaboration of the government program of List 99 in the 1966 elections: Bases for a national development policy. This program contained the main ideas of the developmentalist thinking of the time: agricultural reform, industrial promotion, strengthening of infrastructure, administrative reform, creation of the Central Bank, income tax, educational planning, etcetera.

During the sixties, the Civic Union was also shaken by ideological debates. In 1962, in the heat of these discussions, the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) was formed. Between 1962 and 1964, while the party discussed its ideological orientation, it received important external influences, particularly the doctrine of the Second Vatican Council and the Revolution in Freedom program of the CDP in Chile.[13] Juan Pablo Terra, a key figure in the process of renewal in the Social-Christian thought in Uruguay, also had a very active participation in the CIDE, especially in the housing sector. The mark of developmentalist ideas is very visible in the programmatic proposal of the sector in 1971:

Faced with the national crisis, the CDP proposes the following set of solutions: "To introduce radical changes in the economic structure, (…) through three fundamental tools: integral planning (…); nationalization of monopolistic capitalist property and strategic areas of the economy; agrarian reform and industrial development".[14]

Finally, developmentalist ideas also left their mark in the Programmatic Bases of the Unit (PBU), the electoral platform with which the Frente Amplio made its debut as a political party in 1971. The PBU synthesized various leftist formulations that had been approaching during the second half of the sixties: the social Christian program of Juan Pablo Terra's CDP, the sophisticated fusion of the Batllista tradition with the Eclacist developmentalism of Zelmar Michelini's 99, the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic program of the "first phase of the revolution" that the communists with Rodney Arismendi and the socialists with Vivian Trías had been promoting since the mid-1950s, the turn towards the theory of dependency that had been taking place in the Institute of Economics at the end of the sixties, and the old rationalist and anti-imperialist sowing of the Third World intellectuals since Marcha. In any case, the imprint of developmentalism can be seen in multiple proposals, from the insistence on the centrality of planning to the emphasis on industrialization, including, of course, the "radical agrarian reform".[15]

In short, each political actor examined the CIDE proposals to determine to what extent they were compatible with the positions defended by the party throughout its history. At the end of this process, each party adopted some aspects of the new ideas and discarded others. In addition, very often, the ideas adopted were modified by the party to reconcile them with its discursive tradition. Thus, from the same developmentalist doctrinal trunk, different species ended up deriving. In the NP, under the leadership of Wilson Ferreira, a "white" developmentalism germinated, with emphasis on agriculture and livestock. In the PC, the ideas of the NESDP left their mark, especially in the new generation of Batllista leaders. On the one hand, in List 99 an industrialist, statist and leftist developmentalism was formed. On the other hand, List 15 began a process of revision that culminated, in 1972, in that curious mixture of developmentalism and neoliberalism that can be read in the second NESDP. In the Frente Amplio left, meanwhile, another species of the same genre made its way, in this case, a variety strongly influenced by Dependency Theory and Marxism.

Reforms in Public Policies and State Institutions

This section summarizes the innovations made in public policies and State structures from the installation of the CIDE until the breakdown of democracy in June 1973.

Agriculture

There was no agrarian reform. The main structural change called for by CIDE did not have political support. However, other recommendations did prosper. In the first place, the 1967 Budget Law created the IMPROME, a tax very similar to the one recommended by the "Agricultural CIDE" to promote the increase of land productivity. Secondly, during 1968 the parliament approved, almost verbatim, four of the seven promotion laws proposed by Wilson Ferreira and his team: Fertilizers (13.663), Seeds (13.664), Soil and Water Conservation (13.667) and Forestry (13.723). Thirdly, the regime of private corporations was limited for agricultural and livestock farms. As from 1967 the legislation included the second best of the CIDE: nominative shares.

Industry

During the period analyzed there were several initiatives to promote specific industries. However, the main legacy of the industrial plan prepared by CIDE did not take shape until 1974, at the beginning of the authoritarian period. At that time, the Council of State approved an Industrial Promotion Law that simplified the bill that had reached the half sanction in 1972, which, in turn, was inspired by CIDE's Industrial Plan.

Foreign Trade

Throughout the entire period, the rulers systematically sought to balance the trade balance through the promotion of exports (both traditional and non-traditional). Among the measures adopted, Law 13.268 (July 1964), which institutionalized "protection abroad" through the creation of mechanisms to stimulate the export of industrialized products (tax refunds and reimbursement of surcharges), stands out. Despite CIDE's insistence, there was no selective tariff reduction.

Public Administration

Of all the CIDE proposals, this must be the one that was incorporated most quickly. Just one month after the publication of the NESDP, a constitutional reform "philosophically developmentalist", as Julio María Sanguinetti and Álvaro Pacheco Seré put it, was approved.[16] The new constitution includes a very important number of CIDE initiatives: reorganization of ministries, creation of the civil service, installation of ministerial programming offices, budget by program, etc. The CIDE itself is definitively incorporated into the new constitution. CIDE itself is definitively incorporated into the institutional framework under the name of Planning and Budget Office. From 1967 onwards, successive governments will try to implement the amendments incorporated in the constitutional reform. In the 1967 Budget Law, for example, the National Civil Service Office was created. In 1968, by decree, the proposal for the Financial Ordering of the State of the CIDE plan was incorporated almost in its entirety (Decree 104).[17]

Financial System

In the context of the constitutional reform, the creation of the Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) was approved. Of all the innovations made to address the critical situation of the Uruguayan financial system, this was the most important. The Emergency Law (September 1967) established the basic rules for the organization of the new institution and its tasks. Enrique Iglesias was appointed president of the CBU.

Tax System

This was one of the reforms that made the least progress in the period prior to the coup d'état. The only significant change was the aforementioned creation of the IMPROME. The Income Tax was not strengthened as recommended by the NESDP. It was repealed in 1974, within the framework of the tax reform promoted by the Minister of Economy of the time, Alejandro Végh Villegas.

Education

Throughout the period, various efforts were made to advance towards the goals proposed by CIDE. Article 202 of the new constitution, for example, obliged the legislator to make concrete one of CIDE's greatest desires: the coordination of education. However, it was not until the controversial General Education Law, passed in early 1973, that some of the reforms proposed by CIDE were implemented. Both the main structural features of the educational system embodied in the new law (compulsory basic cycle, strengthening of technical education, multiple entry routes to the University) and the management structure of the educational system (Higher Council of Education and Educational Planning Office) were inspired by the NESDP.

Housing

One of the CIDE proposals most directly incorporated into legislation was the National Housing Plan. This law, enacted in December 1968, had Juan Pablo Terra, the leading figure of the Housing sector of CIDE, as its main drafter. Likewise, during 1972, once elected Senator, Juan Pablo Terra presented the bill for the creation of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, based on the proposal he himself had prepared at CIDE. The proposal would be taken up, reformulated and approved by the Council of State during the dictatorship.

Price Stabilization

During the period there were two important attempts at price stabilization. Only the first one was directly supported by the respective CIDE proposal. It was carried out by the Minister of Finance, Daniel H. Martins, and operated under the logic of the Social Agreement proposed in CIDE's Annual Plan. The second was carried out in 1968 at the initiative of the Minister of Industries, Jorge Peirano Facio. The price freeze had been designed by the Undersecretary of that portfolio, Ramón Díaz.

Lessons: The CIDE Experience Analyzed From the Literature on the "Nexus" Between Research and Public Policy

At the time, the CIDE experience was considered by most of its protagonists as a "*failure*". It was not: "The National Development Plan prepared by CIDE was not applied in its entirety, but rather isolated recommendations were taken and implemented. However, this does not mean that the CIDE experience could be called a "failure", since, seen in the light of the sixties, it can be said that it played a fermenting role at the level of society as a whole, mainly for having contributed to awaken in it the awareness of underdevelopment and the desire to overcome it"[18].

In fact, the fate of the Uruguayan NESDP was not essentially different from that of other plans elaborated in the context of the Alliance for Progress in other countries of the region. The legend of "failure", in fact, goes far beyond the case of development planning in Uruguay and covers an entire epoch in the efforts to rationalize Latin American public policies. The "plan-book", characteristic of this moment of planning in Latin America, as a general rule was never implemented. However, the "failure" of the plan-book, when viewed from the perspective of the recent literature on the research-public policy nexus, is not a mystery at all. The aim of this section is precisely to analyze this aspect more closely. First, it will examine what the CIDE experience confirms from the literature. Second, it will suggest what this case could contribute to theory development.[19]

Confirmations

First Confirmation: Generally, the Influence of Research on Public Policy Is Indirect, Mediated

Scholars accept that, as a general rule, in contemporary democracies, the relationship between social research and public policy is neither direct nor immediate. There is a very strong consensus in the literature about overcoming models that understand the use of social research as a simple transfer of knowledge from a producer to a consumer. In reality, the influence of social research on policies usually operates cumulatively, as the actors' perception of the causes of certain social phenomena is gradually altered, in a process that Carol Weiss called *enlightenment*.[20]

This is exactly what happened. CIDE's information, diagnoses and proposals deeply permeated Uruguayan society. It was a typical process of *enlightenment*. The national accounts data had a very strong impact on the actors. It was not a whim of Carlos Quijano: since the mid-1950s the country had been stagnating. From that moment on, the political debate took on a more serious and dramatic tone. To the astonishment of those who, shortly before, considered it a "blessed corner", Uruguay was in crisis. The interpretations and causal relationships proposed by the experts to explain the crisis also had a powerful effect on the perceptions of the main actors. CIDE "shed light" on what were the "structural obstacles" that were holding back economic development and mortgaging the social progress made up to mid-century. Latifundia in agricultural structures, indiscriminate protectionism in the industrial sector, and clientelism in state agencies came to the top of the list of culprits. As this diagnosis gained adherents, the demand for reforms became more intense. In the early 1970s, the demand for agrarian reform became one of the most important banners of both the Frente Amplio and the NP. The lowering of tariffs began to recruit support in the liberalist sectors of the traditional parties. The administrative reform, on the other hand, became a unanimous demand of the entire political system.

Many of the ideas of the NESDP continued to shine for a long time in the public policy debate in Uruguay. From this point of view, the strategy adopted by the Technical Secretariat was successful. Explaining this Iglesias said:

> "How do we approach planning? It's not hard to make a plan - pardon the boldness - but it is hard to 'sell' the idea of the plan. That's what matters. We are much less concerned about the plan as a formal instrument than as an instrument of political and private decisions. That is why we have definitely advanced in the task of preparing public and political opinion; we have spent months talking to people, talking to unions, to businessmen, and to all levels of government"[21].

For this reason, the Technical Secretariat made a great effort to disseminate the contents of the Economic Study of Uruguay (in 1963) and the contents of the NESDP (from the beginning of 1965). In the Advance of Tasks 1963, written at the beginning of 1964, it was stated:

> "The interest aroused by the CIDE *Report* in all sectors of opinion in the country resulted in the CIDE being invited to participate in successive meetings, talks, conferences, round tables, television auditions, short courses, etc., starting in June 1963. The CIDE Technical Secretariat understood that it could not withhold its contribution, since to deny it would have meant transforming the *Report* and its conclusions into a simple monographic work, worthy of being included in the library of scholars but inept to continue on its basis an ambitious march in the deepening of the problems of the country's economy and its possible solutions. (…). The list is very long but two of them are worth mentioning (...): Firstly, the meeting held in August in Colonia Suiza with employers' associations grouped in the so-called Coordinating Commission for Economic Development (COMCORDE) and promoted by the latter. (…). The second meeting was held in Montevideo on November 23 and 24 with trade union representatives, sponsored by a group of workers' unions"[22].

The dissemination effort yielded results. CIDE's data, diagnoses and proposals resonated in the public debate for a long time.

Second Confirmation: Dialogue Between Experts and Politicians Is Always Difficult

All the testimonies about the relationship between the experts who worked on the elaboration of the *NESDP* agree: the dialogue between the Technical Secretariat and the government was far from easy. This is not an exception in the Uruguayan case. On the contrary, it is the rule. The literature is emphatic: the relationship between research and public policy is, as a general rule, tense and conflictive:

> "Sometimes research is not designed to be relevant to policy. Sometimes it is so designed, but fails to have an impact because of problems associated with timeliness, presentation, or manner of communication. Sometimes (probably quite often) policy-makers do not see research findings as central to their decision-making. The relationship between research and policy is often tenuous, quite often fraught"[23].

There are multiple reasons that help to understand why this is so. Early on, Max Weber elaborated on the differences between politicians and scientists. The politician exercises power. He must be characterized by passion (dedication to a cause), a sense of responsibility and restraint. In moral terms, he added, the politician navigates between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility. The scientist should also be animated by passion for his task. Just as the politician wants to leave the imprint of his ideals on the world, the scientist is (should be, according to Weber) motivated by the passion to make a "fundamental contribution" to the history of his specific field of knowledge. But the scientist does not necessarily have to be a leader: "the qualities that a man needs to become an excellent scholar or a good teacher are not the same as those required by a man whose performance must be that of a leader as a guide in life and, above all, in politics".[24] Norberto Bobbio, later on, deepened this distinction. He argued that politicians and scientists inhabit opposite worlds: the scientist that of doubt, the politician that of choice (in the sense of deciding between different possible alternatives).[25]

The recent literature on research and public policy has also traversed this contrast. According to Nathan Caplan, the community of decision-makers has important differences in terms of values, priorities and incentives with respect to that of knowledge producers.[26] Between the two communities there is, therefore, inexorably a cultural gap that makes communication between the two communities difficult. Following this lead, the literature has emphasized the reasons for the research-policy gap. Academics and experts do not always study the problems that policy makers need to solve, nor do they make an effort to disseminate the

results of their research in a way that is understandable to the uninitiated. In addition to problems of relevance and language, on the supply side there are often problems of timing. Decision deadlines are always much shorter than research deadlines.

But there are often problems on the demand side as well. Politicians do not necessarily have training or experience in the use of information, nor are they obliged to think that, by governing on the basis of research results, they will have better results than relying on their own convictions and knowledge. Distrust of expert recommendations need not be a symptom of atavism. Even the strongest advocates of the need to increase the incorporation of social research into policy recognize that, paradoxically, the confidence that more frequent use of technical inputs in policy making will result in improved social welfare is, in reality, simply based on a belief. Carol Weiss, one of the most prestigious voices in this field of scholarship, has recently said: "researchers can be wrong too, and for all the gloss given off by words like research, testing and learning, we don't always know what the results might have been if policymakers had decided to ignore the study in question".[27]

In sum, viewed from this theoretical accumulation, the "short-circuit" between the CIDE experts and the rulers of the time should not be dramatized. The problem of timing, one of the most acute conflicts recorded between the rulers of the time and the team of planning experts, is perfectly understandable. For the NP, the Alliance for Progress provided a splendid opportunity: it offered funds for development policies in a context of scarcity, both of resources and of policy alternatives. There was a real urgency to make the plans available. For the experts (remember that many of them were university students), the planning experience was an enormous opportunity to study the national problems in depth and to unravel the mystery of productive stagnation. The rulers of the time became increasingly impatient with what they considered an excessive delay in the elaboration of the plans. They organized the Technical Secretariat in 1961 to prepare the plans that would allow them to take advantage of the resources of the Alliance for Progress. The first "white" collegiate ended and the plans were not ready. The second collegiate began. In November 1963 Kennedy died, in Dallas, but the plans were not finished. The year 1964 passed, and the long-awaited plans were still not available. The Technical Secretariat only formally submitted them to the government for consideration at the end of October 1965, a little more than a year before the national election. Politicians and experts obviously had different priorities. The government wanted to make informed decisions and win votes. The experts were in no great hurry. They were only interested in doing their job as well as possible. In the 1966 national elections, the National Party was defeated. After eight years in opposition, the Colorado Party regained control of the government.

Third Confirmation: Knowledge Is Power

The experience of planning in Uruguay clearly shows to what extent information and technical proposals can serve as weapons in political competition. An anecdote has been circulating for years, the exact magnitude of which is difficult to specify given the distance in time and the different existing versions, but which helps to illustrate this point. In mid-1965, taking advantage of a trip by Iglesias, some government authorities of the time went to the old house on Convención Street where the CIDE operated, demanding the delivery of the plans. According to what was reported, they considered that by adequately using the proposals contained in the plans they could triumph in the national elections of 1966. Ángel Monti, with the support of the officials who were present, refused to accede to this request.[28]

This is not a peculiarity of Uruguay either. Contemporary literature insists a lot on this point. One of the most frequent models for the use of social research is, precisely, the *political model*. In political systems with strict political actors, who have rigid positions and/or are part of rigid coalitions, it is less likely that research can have a direct influence on policies. In these cases it is more frequent that social research is used to attack or defend political positions. In addition, the literature distinguishes the *tactical model*: political actors announce that they are waiting for research results in order not to make decisions or they justify their decisions in research only to transfer the political cost to researchers. In both cases (*political model* and *tactical model*) social research plays an instrumental role with respect to the strategic calculations of the parties.[29]

In this sense, the CIDE experience provides abundant empirical evidence: important actors in the Uruguayan political system adopted CIDE proposals but adapted them to their political survival strategies. The plans became a contested political capital. Some leaders of the new generation saw in the developmentalist proposals an opportunity to boost their careers. Wilson Ferreira obtained a fundamental political benefit by associating his political profile to the task of planning. Jorge Batlle triumphed in the internal elections of 15 in 1965 on the back of an eloquent defense of a constitutional reform that relied heavily on the Administrative Reform chapter of the CIDE. Zelmar Michelini, appealing to the figure of Luis Faroppa, became the great spokesman of developmentalism in the PC.

Much of the explanation for the delay in adopting CIDE's recommendations does not lie in the persistently pointed out disinterest of Uruguayan politicians in the work of planning. *On the contrary, many actors withheld their support for projects they essentially shared when they were not sure they could obtain a sufficiently large share of the implicit political benefit.* During the PN government the Colorados refused to vote for the creation of the Central Bank and opposed the program budget proposal. However, they incorporated both proposals in the *"orange reform"* that had them as decisive protagonists. Other projects such as the agricultural promotion initiatives or the housing law experienced the same trajectory. They were not voted during Wilson Ferreira's term as minister. But they were approved during the Pacheco government, a few years later.

Latest Developments

According to Nutley, Walter and Davies, the dominant model of research use stops at examining relationships between people, between the policy maker and the expert: "The dominant model of research use – for much conceptual work as well as for many empirical studies of the field – envisages individual policy makers and practitioners consciously seeking out and keeping up-to-date with research, and then applying the evidence they thereby glean in their day-to-day work".[30] But, as these authors argue, the literature should seek to go a step further. It is likely that understanding the positions of individuals will require examining organizational traditions and structures. The vicissitudes of planning in Uruguay invite us to formulate two hypotheses that allow, precisely, to deepen the theoretical debate in this direction.

First Hypothesis: The Dynamics of Social Research Depend on Party Ideologies

Each political actor (party or faction) examined the CIDE proposals seeking to determine to what extent the new ideas were compatible with the positions defended by the party throughout its history. At the end of this process, each actor adopted some of the proposals and discarded others. Moreover, very often the ideas adopted were modified by the party to reconcile them with its long term ideology and traditional discourse. Thus, as we have seen, several different branches sprouted from the same developmentalist trunk. The research and policy literature has, in this sense, much to learn from two other different traditions that, to answer different questions, have dealt with how parties adopt new ideas. On the one hand, some work in political economy from historical neo-institutionalism emphasizes that political parties only accept new policy paradigms when they are compatible with their discursive tradition. More than two decades ago, Peter A. Hall used this argument to explain the process of adoption of Keynesian policies.[31] On the other hand, consistency between new positions and the discursive tradition of the party is a fundamental aspect in the debate on the dynamics of ideological and programmatic content of parties, from Hans-Dieter Klingemann to Herbert Kitschelt. Parties cannot adopt positions completely different from those they held in the past. If they do, they risk paying significant political costs. The discursive tradition limits, in this sense, the leaders' room for maneuver.

Second Hypothesis: The Dynamics of Social Research Depend on Political Institutions

There are not many studies aimed at establishing how much (and how) the national context affects the political dynamics of social research. Although, by definition, differences between nations can only be studied through comparative exercises, the CIDE case suggests that at least two features of Uruguayan political structures influenced the dynamics of the recommendations contained in the *NESDP*.

First, the pluralism of the Uruguayan political system made the dynamics of CIDE's proposals even more complex. It is evident that as the dispersion of power among multiple actors increases, the nexus between research and policy becomes more random. This point was noted early on by Harold Wilensky, in one of the few academic texts devoted to this track.[32] Based on the study of budget and spending decisions on social policy, Wilensky argues that the link between research and public policy in the US is much weaker than in other rich countries such as Sweden, Norway, Austria and Germany. Countries with centralized political structures that favor the connection between experts, bureaucrats and politicians tend to use social research input more frequently. In more pluralistic political systems, research plays a smaller role in policy planning but a larger role in political competition. The concentration of power favors the use of social research. In contrast, the pluralistic scheme that characterizes American policy making would be an obstacle to the incorporation of research.

Pluralism generates noise. The concentration of power favors a more direct use of research in policy. The preceding analysis is very interesting for many reasons. First, it offers an excellent example of how to think in terms of political structures the link between research and public policy. Second, it offers a set of hypotheses that, while perfectly plausible, do not seem to be very helpful in explaining the Uruguayan case. Uruguay looks like the USA in the dependent variable (low influence of research on policy). However, it is similar to Sweden, Norway, Austria and Germany in the independent variables (unified trade union movement, centralized business organizations, strong parties, central government). Keep in mind that, as Lanzaro explains,[33] the Uruguayan political system incorporated some features of the neo-corporatist schemes that became widespread in Europe after the Great Depression.

Second, it is likely that some structural characteristics of Uruguayan political parties have made it particularly difficult to incorporate NESDP proposals into policies. In this sense, it is worth going deeper into the approach proposed by Pribble who argues, based on a comparison between Chile and Uruguay, that the type of public policies depends on the characteristics of the parties. More elitist parties, such as the Chilean Concertation (*elite-electoral structure*), will make less socially inclusive policies than a mass party such as the Frente Amplio (*organic-mobilizing structure*). Also, and this is the most important point for the purposes of research and policy theory development, the organizational structure of Chilean parties makes it easier for decisions to be made by an elite with a high standard of technical knowledge. The structure of the Frente Amplio, on the other hand, with its dense web of mechanisms for grassroots participation, hinders any attempt at autonomization by minorities, among them, intellectuals and experts.[34]

Pribble's point deserves to be developed. Not all parties generate the same type of leaders, with the same levels of academic training and vocation for the use of research in public policy as the Chilean ones. It is likely that some of the features that characterized the traditional Uruguayan parties during the 1960s (*caudillista* leadership, little bureaucratization, links with voters that are more particularistic than programmatic) have made them less permeable than other parties to the dynamics of specialized knowledge, in general, and to the influence of developmentalism, in particular. There is also a theoretical opportunity in the research and public policy literature on the question of the type of parties (organizational structure and links with voters).

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

The NESDP was never implemented as it was intended to be, that is, as an ambitious set of "*harmonious*" and "*necessarily concurrent*" reforms. The laborious effort of conciliation, cooperation and ideological convergence made by the Technical Secretariat in the elaboration of the *NESDP* was subjected by the political actors to a strong dynamic of dispersion, political contest and ideological divergence. This, at least in part, was inevitable given the pluralism that characterizes Uruguayan democracy and the high strictness of its political parties. However, this divergent pattern was aggravated by the political situation of ideological polarization that marked the five years prior to the breakdown of democracy.

However, the task of planning left an abundant legacy. Although not many of the proposals contained in the NESDP were incorporated into public policies or translated into institutional changes during the decade following the publication of the plan, as the literature on the *nexus* between research and public

policies teaches, CIDE's influence was indirect and mediated. The information, diagnoses, and recommendations for "*structural changes*" generated and disseminated by the CIDE throughout its five years of work changed the perception of national problems and their possible solutions by the main actors. It was, as Carol Weiss should expected, an authentic process of *enlightenment*. The process also ratifies two other conclusions widely studied in the literature on the subject. Following a universal pattern, the dialogue between the "two communities", that of the development experts and that of the government of the time, was generally tense and conflictive. The experience of planning in Uruguay also clearly shows the extent to which information and technical proposals can serve as weapons in political competition. In addition to ratifying some well-known hypotheses in the research and public policy literature, the case of planning in Uruguay within the framework of the Alliance for Progress invites us to develop the theory in other directions. In particular, it highlights the importance of ideologies and political institutions, aspects little explored to date in this field.

CIDE's ideas were not ignored by the parties. On the contrary, the main political actors of the time, sooner or later, to a greater or lesser extent, ended up being nourished by them. Of course, the parties refused to apply the Plan as a take-it-or-leave-it package, as an indivisible and indisputable totality. They were unwilling to give up on thoroughly examining the relevance of the Plan's proposals. In my view, political leaders were under no obligation to adopt directly and submissively the recommendations of the experts. To assume otherwise implies accepting, consciously or unconsciously, a model of public policy making with a technocratic bias, according to which, policy would be merely the transmission belt of the "truth" revealed by scientific knowledge. However, they were very willing to analyze, one by one, the different proposed reforms and, if necessary, to support them.

In fact, the political impact of CIDE can only be properly interpreted when the whole process is examined from a radically different perspective, which assumes that what is normal in a complex, pluralistic political system, with strict, consistent political actors (such as the Uruguayan one) is precisely that changes in policies and institutions take place in a disorderly way, at a slow pace, and without obeying any pre-established rational plan. The incorporation of new ideas into public policies, therefore, takes place through actors, institutions and political decisions. Perhaps a metaphor from physics will allow me to illustrate this aspect: as ideas pass through the political system -like light passing from one medium to another of different density, as in the varying degrees of strictness in political actors- they refract. Ideas influence politics (they provide values, specialized knowledge and policy paradigms); politics, in turn, operate on these ideas: it modifies them, it "refracts" them…

The parties adopted NESDP proposals but subjected them to a double adaptation process. On the one hand, a process of ideological adaptation was verified: each political actor (party or fraction) examined the ideas of the CIDE seeking to determine to what extent the new ideological wave was compatible with the positions defended by the party throughout its history. At the end of this process, each party adopted some aspects of the new ideas and discarded others. In addition, very often, the ideas adopted were modified by the party to reconcile them with its tradition. Thus, from the same developmentalist doctrinal trunk, several different "species" will end up deriving. In the NP, and around Wilson's leadership, a "white" developmentalism was born, which placed special emphasis on the agricultural problem. In the CP, an industrialist and protectionist developmentalism appeared almost simultaneously in List 99 and a mixture of developmentalism and liberalism in Jorge Batlle's List 15. On the left, the ideas of the CIDE were combined with the different traditions (communist, socialist and social Christian) and with other paradigms in vogue (such as dependency), feeding the programmatic elaboration of the Frente Amplio.

But the NESDP recommendations were not only examined by the political parties in the light of their ideological traditions. Strategic considerations also played a role in the process of adopting the new ideas: the position taken by each actor regarding the NESDP was strongly influenced by cost-benefit calculations. The strategic calculations of the political actors considerably complicated the implementation of the reforms proposed by the CIDE. The CIDE's plans quickly became political capital in dispute. Thus, much of the explanation for the delay in adopting the CIDE's recommendations does not lie in Uruguayan politicians' persistently reported disinterest in the work of indicative planning: on the contrary, many actors withheld

their support for projects they essentially shared when they were not sure they could obtain a sufficiently large share of the implicit political benefit.

The planning experience left a very valuable legacy in several dimensions. But it also offers fundamental lessons regarding the link between technique and politics in Uruguay. The first great lesson is that it was worth the effort. The sowing was deep and generous. The harvest, more in the long term than in the short term, was abundant. Thanks to the work carried out by the CIDE Technical Secretariat, society significantly improved the quality of its public debate. More information circulated, more and better discussions were held on structural problems and pending challenges, institutions, public policies and party traditions were renewed.

The second lesson is that experts should not forget that the decision-makers are the political leaders. It is a profound mistake in terms of the theory of democracy to expect the elected rulers to abdicate in favor of the planner, however talented, well inspired and informed the latter may be. Political leaders have an obligation to review the recommendations of experts. It is a democratic mandate and, therefore, it cannot be renounced. They have an obligation to contrast new proposals with their best traditions. And they also have an obligation to take into account political costs and benefits.

The third lesson concerns political leaders. Too often, at least in Uruguay, they tend to have too much confidence in their own knowledge and too much distrust of other knowledge. Too often they forget that the problems of governance require information, evidence, theory. Uruguay enjoys a good quality democracy in comparative terms. But its public policies do not always exhibit the quality they could in strictly technical terms. Politicians have an obligation to improve the health of the bridge between academic research and policy making. Throughout history, when that bridge was wide and comfortable, the sophistication of public decisions and policies grew, the citizenry benefited and democracy was strengthened.

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ENDNOTES

1. This text is a corrected version of the one published in Contemporánea, Volume 2, year 2, 2011, entitled "Investigación y políticas públicas: Planes de Desarrollo en Uruguay en tiempos de la Alianza para el Progreso. It was also publisched in spanish in Adolfo Garcé and Armando Cartes (coordinadores). Dossier: "Poder, Región y Nación en la construcción de las instituciones políticas de América Latina durante el siglo XIX", Revista de Historia, 24(2), Universidad de Concepción, 2019. It is based on my master's thesis. The field work was carried out between 1998 and 2001.
2. During the following decades, Enrique Iglesias had an outstanding career. Among other responsabilies, he was Secretary of ECLAC (1972-1984), Minister of Foreing Affairs of Uruguay (1985-1988) President of IDB (1988-2005), and Secretary of the Ibero-American Secretariat General.
3. The map of the sectors was changing from 1962 to 1965. By 1963, the working groups were as follows: General Programming, National Accounts, Demographics, Program Budget, Monetary and Banking Problems, Agriculture, Industrial, Public (Public Finance), Investment Projects, Labor and Social Welfare, Energy, Transportation, Education, Regional Programming, Health, Housing, Tourism and Telecommunications, Institutional Framework (Public Administration), External. See: Advance of Tasks 1963 and 1962, CIDE.
4. CIDE. 1964. Avance de tareas 1963. Montevideo, Comisión de Inversiones y Desarrollo Económico, Montevideo.
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6. Interview by the author. Montevideo, November 1998. Interview conducted in the city of Buenos Aires.
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9. Barbato, Celia. 1986. “Economía in Ciencia y Tecnología en Uruguay,” Montevideo, Ministry of Education and Culture - CINVE.
10. Interview by the author. Montevideo, February 2001.
11. Garcé, A. 2002. Ideas y competencia política, Montevideo, Trilce. See Chapter 2, “Antecedentes de la planificación”.
12. The link between both plans, the one elaborated at CIDE and the one of the OPP, was systematically studied in Garcé, A. 2000. “La partitura, la orquesta, el director y algo más”, in J. Lanzaro (coordinator), La “segunda” transición en el Uruguay, Montevideo, Fundación de Cultura Universitaria.
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14. Pérez Antón, R. Los cristianos y la política..., 90-91.
15. The Communist Party and the Socialist Party criticized the planning experience for its link to the White House. Carlos Quijano, director of the influential magazine Marcha, distanced himself from the CIDE for the same reason. See: Garcé, A. Ideas y competencia política .... pp. 46-47. For a discussion of the link between CIDE and the “new left”, between “reform” and “revolution”, see: Frens-String, J. 2011. “Revolution through Reform Popular Assemblies, Housing Cooperatives and Uruguay’s New Left”, in Contemporánea, Volume 2, year 2, pp. 12-30.
16. See: Sanguinetti, Julio María and Pacheco Seré, Andrés. 1971. La nueva constitución, Montevideo, Alfa.
17. In 1972, the OPP elaborated the National Development Plan 1973-1977, which had a great influence on the public policies of the dictatorship. In 1977 (now under the name of SEPLACODI), the II National Development Plan: Basic Strategic Guidelines was elaborated. When reviewing half a century of institutional history, it can be concluded that the OPP gradually lost its original emphasis on planning: “While the creation of the office was justified by the need to have a long-term view, throughout its existence the elaboration and execution of global plans has practically disappeared. The initial planning impulse was maintained during its foundational stage. It was strengthened, although losing the original democratic and participative spirit, during the years of the civil-military dictatorship in which SEPLACODI acted (1976-1984), when its control and coordination role was strengthened. During the restoration of democracy (1985-1990), without the planning drive of the 1970s, the character of a “planning” office was maintained, although the emphasis was not global; the plans were rather sectorial and regional, and the perspective was medium term”. See: Bértola, L. (coordinator). 2018. 50 años de la OPP, Montevideo, Fin de Siglo, P. 29.
18. Bittencourt, Galván, Moreira and Vázquez. 2012. Planning in the context of postwar development strategies.... p. 96.
19. The “failure” of planning fueled an intense debate, especially at ECLAC. A good testimony of this controversy is issue 31 of CEPAL Review, 1987. To trace the evolution of the concept of planning in Latin America, the article by C. de Mattos “Plans versus planning in the Latin American experience”, published in No. 8 of CEPAL Review, August 1979, is particularly recommendable.
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28. Testimony of Alberto Couriel. Interview by the author. Montevideo, November 1998.
29. A synthesis of the different models of using research in policy can be read in Nutley. S, Walter.I and H. Davies, Using Evidence, pp.38-40.
30. Ibid., p.302.
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