Influential Article Review - The Securitization of Energy Entrepreneurship During Megacity Counterinsurgencies from A Nato Viewpoint

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This paper examines economics and governance. We present insights from a highly influential paper. Here are the highlights from this paper: The rapid urbanization around the world has generated a tremendous interest in the study of megacity insurgencies. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new field of study—of expeditionary energy economics (e3)—that addresses energy management in the military expeditionary environment (EMMEE), particularly through the promotion of (global/local) entrepreneurship. This study argues that successful megacity counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns of the twenty-first century will depend on fast solutions to critical energy infrastructure (CEI) vulnerabilities within individual communities. The implementation of e3 requires that COIN practitioners have a basic understanding of community-based entrepreneurship (CBE), high-risk/high-impact innovation (HRH2I), and the CEI that these individual communities rely upon. Empirical evidence is also discussed to support a proposed e3 definition. For our overseas readers, we then present the insights from this paper in Spanish, French, Portuguese, and German.

Keywords: Expeditionary energy economics, Megacity counterinsurgency, Energy security, Energy management in the military expeditionary environment, High-risk/high-impact innovation, Critical energy infrastructure, Community-based entrepreneurship, Energy entrepreneurship

SUMMARY

- Along the entire Haifa Street, control over the socioeconomic structure at local levels lay in the hands of insurgents and the black market; they also controlled access to the two biggest needs of the urban community: fuel and electricity. While 1-14 CAV could temporarily become the guarantor of security, it could not guarantee the uninterrupted supply of fuels and electricity into the community. Even if new generators were brought in the community, without fuel they would not run, schools would be dark, businesses would not flourish, water pumps would not work, and sewer facilities would not run. Their owners—Abbas, Yusif, Amid, Kaleb, Munthel, and Mokdam—had no entrepreneurship training but were open to work with the NAC and the infantry platoon to supply the neighborhood with electricity. With the assistance of the infantry platoon, the six generator owners, the two electricians, and the five accountants set the parameters of the electrical grid: each household attached to the grid agreed to pay a monthly fee in exchange for 3

h of electricity during the day and 3 h during the night, limiting lighting points per house to four lamps and a socket for one energy-efficient appliance . To ensure availability of resources to all, load limiters were installed for each line pulled from the generator. By mid-July, Abbas alone was distributing power to over 120 households and was able to reap a net profit of almost $1000 a month. With civil-military assistance, Yusif, Amid, Kaleb, Munthel, and Mokdam developed similar electricity supply grids, and one generator owner, Munthel, received a Coalition Forces micro-grant for generator maintenance and the purchase of a new generator. By September of 2007, over 500 households and 24+ shops that did not have access to electricity since 2003 could now enjoy it .

- The Haifa Street case study during the Surge of 2007 is a clear illustration of how CBE & HRH2I with the assistance of civil-military actions can help in the CEI rehabilitation efforts during megacity COIN Clear and Hold operations—where the freedom of movement for civilian reconstruction teams is highly restricted.

HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL ARTICLE

We used the following article as a basis of our evaluation:

Iftimie, I. A. (2018). Expeditionary energy economics (e3): the securitization of energy entrepreneurship during megacity counterinsurgencies (a NATO perspective). Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 7(1), 1–10.

This is the link to the publisher's website:
https://innovation-entrepreneurship.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s13731-018-0083-6

INTRODUCTION

In January of 2017, another $1.4 billion was invested to increase the supply of electricity to—and improve the reliability of—the Iraqi power infrastructure (Egan 2017), which is in the process of synchronizing with the Iranian national grid. Since 2003, over $30 billion (Ibrahim 2014) was spent on similar national-level projects to rehabilitate the electricity sector in Iraq. Despite renovations on multiple large power stations, however, widespread power outages continue to affect most of Baghdad's communities. Reflecting on these failed investments in large power stations, Richard Haass—president of the Council on Foreign Relations—noted that "they cost a lot of money, they were all done at the top, they took a long time, and they made wonderful targets for terrorists. It would have been a lot better early on if we bought as many generators as we could and brought them over. We could have had something that could have been quickly dispersed, much less expensive, and it wouldn't have provided a target for terrorists" (Haass 2010). According to independent research, this alternative approach would have significantly reduced the annual costs—caused by electrical grid failures—of $3–4 billion (Al-Rikabi 2017).

This article proposes that the study of energy management in the military expeditionary environment (EMMEE) is critical for future megacity counterinsurgency (COIN) deployments. In urban areas such as Baghdad—with a population of over eight million people, which is more than the five million limit established by the United Nations to qualify as a megacity (Lundqvist et al. 2005)—a successful megacity COIN campaign requires not only long-term investments in critical energy infrastructure (CEI) but also short-term results. A new field of expeditionary energy economics (e3)—the study of EMMEE—must be introduced as part of the "Maneuver, Fires and Effects" (MFE) officer formation at the lowest levels. Without understanding this applied sub-discipline of energy economics, it will be impossible to compete against insurgencies and associated entities inherent to megacity slums of the twenty-first century (e.g., the black markets and the human, organ, and drug trafficking).

CONCLUSION

In a century marked by rapid urbanization across the world (Fig. 7), EMMEE is no longer possible in the absence of electricity—which is why e3 should be an essential consideration of every megacity COIN and disaster recovery planning. This change in urban demographics also concerned US Secretary of State Colin Powell when he warned the US President that the invasion "isn't just a simple matter of going to Baghdad," but about "what happens after," when the military becomes responsible of rebuilding the CEI. "If you break it, you own it," Secretary Powell famously argued (Breslow 2016). After over one decade of war and tens of billions of dollars spent on reconstruction of national-level CEI in Iraq, the unreliability of the grid continues to force individual communities to rely on diesel generators as the primary sources of electricity (Egan 2017). This underscores the need for military commanders to pay more attention to e3 in the planning of future megacity COIN campaigns.

The successful implementation of e3 requires that COIN practitioners have a basic understanding of CEI. On Haifa Street, before the 2007 surge, the unreliability of CEI created a safe haven and power base for insurgents. During the surge, however, the effect of civil-military units promoting CBE & HRH2I as a solution to local energy supply shortages on Haifa Street was a significant increase in the standard of living (with increased support for the Coalition Forces). The Haifa Street case study shows that one of the most vital elements of successful megacity COIN is facilitating rapid access of the urban community to affordable and reliable energy sources—which is a matter of managing both security of CEI and security of supply.

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TRANSLATED VERSION: SPANISH

Below is a rough translation of the insights presented above. This was done to give a general understanding of the ideas presented in the paper. Please excuse any grammatical mistakes and do not hold the original authors responsible for these mistakes.

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INTRODUCCIÓN

En enero de 2017, se invirtieron otros 1.400 millones de dólares para aumentar el suministro de electricidad y mejorar la fiabilidad de la infraestructura eléctrica iraquí (Egan 2017), que está en proceso de sincronización con la red nacional iraní. Desde 2003, se gastaron más de 30.000 millones de dólares (Ibrahim 2014) en proyectos similares a nivel nacional para rehabilitar el sector eléctrico en Iraq. Sin embargo, a pesar de las renovaciones en varias grandes centrales eléctricas, los cortes de energía

generalizados siguen afectando a la mayoría de las comunidades de Bagdad. Reflexionando sobre estas inversiones fallidas en grandes centrales eléctricas, Richard Haass,presidente del Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores, señaló que "cuestan mucho dinero, todos se hicieron en la cima, tardaron mucho tiempo e hicieron objetivos maravillosos para los terroristas. Hubiera sido mucho mejor desde el principio si compramos tantos generadores como pudiéramos y los hubiéramos traído. Podríamos haber tenido algo que podría haber sido rápidamente dispersado, mucho menos costoso, y no habría proporcionado un objetivo para los terroristas" (Haass 2010). Según investigaciones independientes, este enfoque alternativo habría reducido significativamente los costos anuales —causados por fallas en la red eléctrica— de $3-4 mil millones (Al-Rikabi 2017).

Este artículo propone que el estudio de la gestión de la energía en el entorno expedicionario militar (EMMEE) es fundamental para futuros despliegues de contrainsurgencia megaciudad (COIN). En zonas urbanas como Bagdad, con una población de más de ocho millones de personas, que es más del límite de cinco millones establecido por las Naciones Unidas para calificar como una megaciudad (Lundqvist et al. 2005), una campaña exitosa de la megaciudad COIN requiere no sólo inversiones a largo plazo en infraestructura energética crítica (CEI), sino también resultados a corto plazo. Un nuevo campo de economía de la energía expedicionaria (e3), el estudio de EMMEE, debe introducirse como parte de la formación de oficiales de "Maniobra, Incendios y Efectos" (MFE) en los niveles más bajos. Sin entender esta subdisciplina aplicada de la economía energética, será imposible competir contra las insurgencias y entidades asociadas inherentes a los barrios marginales de megaciudad del siglo XXI (por ejemplo, los mercados negros y el tráfico de personas, órganos y drogas).

CONCLUSIÓN

En un siglo marcado por una rápida urbanización en todo el mundo (Fig. 7), EMMEE ya no es posible en ausencia de electricidad, razón por la cual e3 debería ser una consideración esencial de cada megaciudad de la COIN y la planificación de la recuperación ante desastres. Este cambio en la demografía urbana también se refería al Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos, Colin Powell, cuando advirtió al presidente de los Estados Unidos que la invasión "no es sólo una simple cuestión de ir a Bagdad", sino de "lo que sucede después", cuando el ejército se hace responsable de reconstruir la CEI. "Si lo rompes, lo posees", argumentó el Secretario Powell (Breslow 2016). Después de más de una década de guerra y decenas de miles de millones de dólares gastados en la reconstrucción de la CEI a nivel nacional en Irak, la irresonabilidad de la red sigue obligando a las comunidades individuales a confiar en los generadores de diésel como fuentes primarias de electricidad (Egan 2017). Esto pone de relieve la necesidad de que los comandantes militares presten más atención a e3 en la planificación de futuras campañas de la megaciudad COIN.

La implementación exitosa de e3 requiere que los profesionales de COIN tengan una comprensión básica de LA CEI. En la calle Haifa, antes del aumento de 2007, la falta de fiabilidad de LA CEI creó un refugio seguro y una base de energía para los insurgentes. Durante el aumento, sin embargo, el efecto de las unidades civiles-militares que promueven CBE y HRH2I como una solución a la escasez de suministro de energía local en la calle Haifa fue un aumento significativo en el nivel de vida (con un mayor apoyo a las Fuerzas de la Coalición). El estudio de caso de Haifa Street muestra que uno de los elementos más vitales de la exitosa megaciudad COIN es facilitar el acceso rápido de la comunidad urbana a fuentes de energía asequibles y confiables, lo que es una cuestión de administrar tanto la seguridad de la CEI como la seguridad del suministro.

TRANSLATED VERSION: FRENCH

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INTRODUCTION

En janvier 2017, 1,4 milliard de dollars ont été investis pour accroître l'approvisionnement en électricité et améliorer la fiabilité de l'infrastructure électrique irakienne (Egan 2017), qui est en train de se synchroniser avec le réseau national iranien. Depuis 2003, plus de 30 milliards de dollars (Ibrahim 2014) ont été consacrés à des projets similaires au niveau national pour réhabiliter le secteur de l'électricité en Irak. Malgré les rénovations de plusieurs grandes centrales, cependant, des coupures de courant généralisées continuent d'affecter la plupart des communautés de Bagdad. Revenant sur ces investissements ratés dans les grandes centrales électriques, Richard Haass, président du Council on Foreign Relations, a noté qu'« ils coûtent beaucoup d'argent, ils ont tous été faits au sommet, ils ont pris beaucoup de temps, et ils ont fait de merveilleuses cibles pour les terroristes. Il aurait été beaucoup mieux dès le début si nous avons acheté autant de générateurs que nous le pouvions et les a apportés plus. Nous aurions pu avoir quelque chose qui aurait pu être rapidement dispersé, beaucoup moins cher, et il n'aurait pas fourni une cible pour les terroristes » (Haass 2010). Selon des recherches indépendantes, cette approche alternative aurait considérablement réduit les coûts annuels , causés par les pannes de réseau électrique , de 3 à 4 milliards de dollars (Al-Rikabi 2017).

Cet article propose que l'étude de la gestion de l'énergie dans l'environnement expéditionnaire militaire (EMMEE) soit essentielle pour les futurs déploiements de la contre-insurrection des mégapoles (COIN). Dans les zones urbaines comme Bagdad , avec une population de plus de huit millions d'habitants, ce qui est supérieur à la limite de cinq millions établie par les Nations Unies pour être considérée comme une mégapole (Lundqvist et al., 2005) — une campagne réussie de la mégapole COIN exige non seulement des investissements à long terme dans les infrastructures énergétiques essentielles (CEI), mais aussi des résultats à court terme. Un nouveau domaine de l'économie expéditionnaire de l'énergie (e3) — l'étude de l'emmee — doit être introduit dans le cadre de la formation d'officiers « Manœuvre, Incendies et Effets » (MFE) aux niveaux les plus bas. Sans comprendre cette sous-discipline appliquée de l'économie de l'énergie, il sera impossible de rivaliser avec les insurrections et les entités associées inhérentes aux bidonvilles des mégapoles du xxie siècle (par exemple, les marchés noirs et le trafic humain, d'organe et de drogue).

CONCLUSION

Dans un siècle marqué par une urbanisation rapide à travers le monde (fig. 7), l'emmee n'est plus possible en l'absence d'électricité, c'est pourquoi l'e3 devrait être une considération essentielle de chaque mégapole COIN et la planification de récupération après sinistre. Ce changement démographique urbain a également inquiété le secrétaire d'État américain Colin Powell lorsqu'il a averti le président américain que l'invasion « n'est pas seulement une simple question d'aller à Bagdad », mais de « ce qui se passe après », lorsque l'armée devient responsable de la reconstruction de la CEI. « Si vous le cassez, vous le possédez », a fait valoir le secrétaire Powell (Breslow 2016). Après plus d'une décennie de guerre et des dizaines de milliards de dollars dépensés pour la reconstruction de la CEI au niveau national en Irak, le manque de fiabilité du réseau continue de forcer les communautés individuelles à compter sur les générateurs diesel comme principales sources d'électricité (Egan 2017). Cela souligne la nécessité pour les commandants militaires de prêter plus d'attention à l'e3 dans la planification des futures campagnes de la mégapole COIN.

La mise en œuvre réussie de l'e3 exige que les praticiens de coin aient une compréhension de base de l'ie. Sur la rue Haïfa, avant la flambée de 2007, le manque de fiabilité de la CEI a créé un refuge sûr et une base de pouvoir pour les insurgés. Toutefois, pendant la poussée, l'effet des unités civilo-militaires qui font la promotion de la CBE & HRH2I comme solution aux pénuries locales d'énergie sur la rue Haïfa a été une

augmentation significative du niveau de vie (avec un soutien accru aux Forces de la Coalition). L'étude de cas de la rue Haïfa montre que l'un des éléments les plus vitaux du succès de la mégapole COIN est de faciliter l'accès rapide de la communauté urbaine à des sources d'énergie abordables et fiables, ce qui est une question de gestion à la fois de la sécurité de l'iee et de la sécurité d'approvisionnement.

TRANSLATED VERSION: GERMAN

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EINLEITUNG

Im Januar 2017 wurden weitere 1,4 Milliarden Dollar investiert, um die Stromversorgung der irakischen Strominfrastruktur (Egan 2017), die gerade mit dem iranischen nationalen Netz synchronisiert wird, zu erhöhen und die Zuverlässigkeit der irakischen Energieinfrastruktur zu verbessern. Seit 2003 wurden über 30 Milliarden Dollar (Ibrahim 2014) für ähnliche nationale Projekte zur Sanierung des Elektrizitätssektors im Irak ausgegeben. Trotz Renovierungen mehrerer großer Kraftwerke sind jedoch nach wie vor weitverbreitete Stromausfälle betroffen, die die meisten Gemeinden Bagdads betreffen. Richard Haass, Präsident des Council on Foreign Relations, sagte angesichts dieser gescheiterten Investitionen in große Kraftwerke: "Sie kosteten viel Geld, sie wurden alle an der Spitze gemacht, sie brauchten eine lange Zeit, und sie machten wunderbare Ziele für Terroristen. Es wäre früh viel besser gewesen, wenn wir so viele Generatoren wie möglich gekauft und über bord gebracht hätten. Wir hätten etwas haben können, das schnell hätte zerstreut werden können, viel billiger, und es hätte kein Ziel für Terroristen sein können" (Haass 2010). Unabhängigen Untersuchungen zufolge hätte dieser alternative Ansatz die jährlichen Kosten – verursacht durch Ausfälle des Stromnetzes – um 3–4 Milliarden Dollar (Al-Rikabi 2017) erheblich gesenkt.

Dieser Artikel schlägt vor, dass die Untersuchung des Energiemanagements im militärischen Expeditionsumfeld (EMMEE) für zukünftige Megacity-Aufstandsbekämpfungseinsätze (COIN) von entscheidender Bedeutung ist. In städtischen Gebieten wie Bagdad – mit einer Bevölkerung von über acht Millionen Menschen, die mehr als die von den Vereinten Nationen festgelegte Fünf-Millionen-Grenze ist, um sich als Megacity zu qualifizieren (Lundqvist et al. 2005) – erfordert eine erfolgreiche Megacity-COIN-Kampagne nicht nur langfristige Investitionen in die kritische Energieinfrastruktur (CEI), sondern auch kurzfristige Ergebnisse. Ein neues Feld der expeditionären Energieökonomie (e3) – die Studie von EMMEE – muss im Rahmen der Offiziersausbildung "Manöver, Brände und Auswirkungen" (MFE) auf den niedrigsten Ebenen eingeführt werden. Ohne diese angewandte Unterdisziplin der Energieökonomie zu verstehen, wird es unmöglich sein, mit Aufständen und damit verbundenen Entitäten zu konkurrieren, die megacity Slums des 21. Jahrhunderts innewohnen (z. B. Die Schwarzmärkte und der Menschenhandel, Organ- und Drogenhandel).

SCHLUSSFOLGERUNG

In einem Jahrhundert, das von einer raschen Urbanisierung auf der ganzen Welt geprägt ist (Abb. 7), ist EMMEE ohne Strom nicht mehr möglich – deshalb sollte e3 eine wesentliche Überlegung für jede

Megacity-COIN und Disaster Recovery-Planung sein. Diese Veränderung der städtischen Demografie betraf auch US-Außenminister Colin Powell, als er den US-Präsidenten warnte, dass die Invasion "nicht nur eine einfache Sache ist, nach Bagdad zu gehen", sondern darum, "was danach passiert", wenn das Militär für den Wiederaufbau des CEI verantwortlich wird. "Wenn du es brechst, besitzt du es", argumentierte Minister Powell berühmt (Breslow 2016). Nach mehr als einem Jahrzehnt des Krieges und zig Milliarden Dollar, die für den Wiederaufbau der CEI auf nationaler Ebene im Irak ausgegeben wurden, zwingt die Unzuverlässigkeit des Netzes einzelne Gemeinden weiterhin dazu, sich auf Dieselgeneratoren als Hauptstromquellen zu verlassen (Egan 2017). Dies unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit, dass militärische Kommandeure e3 bei der Planung künftiger Megacity-COIN-Kampagnen mehr Aufmerksamkeit schenken müssen.

Die erfolgreiche Implementierung von e3 setzt voraus, dass COIN-Praktizierende ein grundlegendes Verständnis von CEI haben. Auf der Haifa Street, vor dem Anstieg 2007, schuf die Unzuverlässigkeit von CEI einen sicheren Hafen und eine Machtbasis für Aufständische. Während des Anstiegs jedoch war der Effekt zivil-militärischer Einheiten, die CBE & HRH2I als Lösung für die lokale Energieversorgung in der Haifa Street förderten, eine signifikante Erhöhung des Lebensstandards (mit erhöhter Unterstützung für die Koalitionstruppen). Die Fallstudie Haifa Street zeigt, dass eines der wichtigsten Elemente einer erfolgreichen Megacity COIN darin besteht, den schnellen Zugang der städtischen Gemeinschaft zu erschwinglichen und zuverlässigen Energiequellen zu erleichtern – was sowohl die Verwaltung der Sicherheit von CEI als auch die Versorgungssicherheit betrifft.

TRANSLATED VERSION: PORTUGUESE

Below is a rough translation of the insights presented above. This was done to give a general understanding of the ideas presented in the paper. Please excuse any grammatical mistakes and do not hold the original authors responsible for these mistakes.

VERSÃO TRADUZIDA: PORTUGUÊS

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INTRODUÇÃO

Em janeiro de 2017, foram investidos mais 1,4 mil milhões de dólares para aumentar o fornecimento de eletricidade e melhorar a fiabilidade da infraestrutura de energia iraquiana (Egan 2017), que está em processo de sincronização com a rede nacional iraniana. Desde 2003, mais de 30 mil milhões de dólares (Ibrahim 2014) foram gastos em projetos semelhantes a nível nacional para reabilitar o sector da eletricidade no Iraque. Apesar das renovações em várias grandes centrais elétricas, no entanto, as falhas de energia generalizadas continuam a afetar a maioria das comunidades de Bagdade. Refletindo sobre estes investimentos falhados em grandes centrais elétricas, Richard Haass - presidente do Conselho de Relações Exteriores - observou que "custam muito dinheiro, foram todos feitos no topo, demoraram muito tempo, e fizeram alvos maravilhosos para terroristas. Teria sido muito melhor no início se comprássemos tantos geradores quanto pudemos e os trouxessemos. Poderíamos ter tido algo que poderia ter sido rapidamente disperso, muito menos dispendioso, e não teria sido um alvo para terroristas" (Haass 2010). De acordo com pesquisas independentes, esta abordagem alternativa teria reduzido significativamente os custos anuais - causados por falhas na rede elétrica - de 3 a 4 mil milhões de dólares (Al-Rikabi 2017).

Este artigo propõe que o estudo da gestão energética no ambiente expedicionário militar (EMMEE) seja fundamental para futuras implantações de contrainsurgência da megacidade (COIN). Em áreas urbanas como Bagdade , com uma população de mais de oito milhões de pessoas, que é mais do que o limite de cinco milhões estabelecido pelas Nações Unidas para se qualificar como megacidade (Lundqvist et al.

2005)- uma campanha de megacidade bem sucedida da COIN requer não só investimentos a longo prazo em infraestruturas energéticas críticas (CEI), mas também resultados a curto prazo. Um novo campo de economia energética expedicionária (e3)- o estudo da EMMEE - deve ser introduzido como parte da formação de oficiais "Manobra, Incêndios e Efeitos" (MFE) nos níveis mais baixos. Sem compreender esta subdisciplina aplicada da economia energética, será impossível competir contra insurreições e entidades associadas inerentes a favelas do século XXI (por exemplo, os mercados negros e o tráfico de seres humanos, órgãos e drogas).

CONCLUSÃO

Num século marcado pela rápida urbanização em todo o mundo (Fig. 7), a EMMEE já não é possível na ausência de eletricidade — razão pela qual a e3 deve ser uma consideração essencial de cada megacidade da MOEDA e do planeamento de recuperação de desastres. Esta mudança na demografia urbana também dizia respeito ao Secretário de Estado dos EUA, Colin Powell, quando avisou o Presidente dos EUA que a invasão "não é apenas uma simples questão de ir para Bagdad", mas sobre "o que acontece depois", quando os militares se tornam responsáveis pela reconstrução do CEI. "Se o quebrares, és o dono", argumentou o secretário Powell (Breslow 2016). Depois de mais de uma década de guerra e dezenas de milhares de milhões de dólares gastos na reconstrução do CEI a nível nacional no Iraque, a falta de fiabilidade da rede continua a forçar as comunidades individuais a confiarem nos geradores de gasóleo como as principais fontes de eletricidade (Egan 2017). Isto sublinha a necessidade de os comandantes militares prestarem mais atenção à e3 no planeamento de futuras campanhas de megacidade COIN.

A implementação bem sucedida do e3 requer que os praticantes de MOEDA tenham uma compreensão básica do CEI. Na Rua Haifa, antes da onda de 2007, a falta de fiabilidade do CEI criou um porto seguro e uma base de poder para os insurgentes. Durante o aumento, no entanto, o efeito das unidades civis-militares que promovem a CBE & HRH2I como solução para a escassez de energia local na Rua Haifa foi um aumento significativo do nível de vida (com maior apoio às Forças de Coligação). O estudo de caso da Rua Haifa mostra que um dos elementos mais vitais da megacidade de sucesso COIN está a facilitar o acesso rápido da comunidade urbana a fontes de energia acessíveis e fiáveis , o que é uma questão de gerir tanto a segurança do CEI como a segurança do abastecimento.