The Rationality of Cooperation and Prevention in Contract Management: Reducing Conflicts in Heavy Construction and Electromechanical Assembly in Brazil Through the Application of the Causal Mark Theory

Authors

  • João Antônio de Almeida Junior Exxata Tecnologia e Engenharia de Contratos
  • Edivilson Rodrigo da Silva Exxata Tecnologia e Engenharia de Contratos
  • Fernanda Eneias Dutra Exxata Tecnologia e Engenharia de Contratos
  • Emanuelle Barcelos Santos Exxata Tecnologia e Engenharia de Contratos
  • Ana Cláudia Martins Exxata Tecnologia e Engenharia de Contratos
  • Daniela Moura Soares

Keywords:

management, contract management, conflict prevention, heavy construction, Cause Marks Theory

Abstract

This article argues that preventive contract management minimizes conflicts in heavy construction and improves project efficiency. Based on data from 324 heavy construction and electromechanical assembly contracts, including projects in the Mining Sector, the data demonstrate that projects with Contract Management have significantly lower damage/conflict rates. Inspired by prior research on the "Use of the Arrow of Time and Criteria for Transmission of Cause Marks in Conflict Management," presented at the 37th Annual IACM Conference, this study applies the "Cause Marks" theory to mathematically show how clear records prevent ambiguities and reduce financial and temporal impacts. Additionally, we support the thesis that cooperative and preventive attitudes are the most rational and beneficial in any administrative or business environment.

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Published

2025-11-23

How to Cite

de Almeida Junior, J. A., da Silva, E. R., Dutra, F. E., Santos, E. B., Martins, A. C., & Soares, D. M. (2025). The Rationality of Cooperation and Prevention in Contract Management: Reducing Conflicts in Heavy Construction and Electromechanical Assembly in Brazil Through the Application of the Causal Mark Theory. American Journal of Management, 25(4). Retrieved from https://articlearchives.co/index.php/AJM/article/view/7258

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Articles