The Notice-and-Choice Privacy Gamble: Game Theory, Consumer Agency, and Implications for GDPR
Keywords:
marketing, development, consumer agency, game theory, general data protection regulation, notice-and-choice privacy noticesAbstract
This article provides a theoretical basis for why the notice-and-choice model for protecting consumer information privacy might still be considered a viable policy approach despite evidence that privacy notices are often ignored, difficult to read, and misunderstood by consumers. Drawing from several well-known game-theoretic models that map closely to an online consumer’s notice-and-choice context, we outline a rational choice model for consumer online privacy and discuss its relevance for the EU’s General Data Protection Regulations [GDPR]. We argue that an online consumer’s notice-and-choice privacy gamble is a reasonable bet when constrained by competition and the presence of meaningful regulation.
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Published
2023-11-23
How to Cite
Hettche, M., Kim, D.-H., & Clayton, M. J. (2023). The Notice-and-Choice Privacy Gamble: Game Theory, Consumer Agency, and Implications for GDPR. Journal of Marketing Development and Competitiveness, 17(3). Retrieved from https://articlearchives.co/index.php/JMDC/article/view/5935
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